Search results

This paper, which is both case study and conceptual in nature, presents a relative cost-benefit model to explain why people engage in criminal activity. It then uses the model to motivate a discussion of the major policy approaches to recidivism reduction and desistance, or decreasing the frequency and severity of criminal activity, a more nuanced measure of harm reduction than the binary concept of recidivism typically used to evaluate program success. Several private programs have successfully reduced recidivism and improved measures of desistance but remain applicable only to those who self-select into them. Changed policies and incentives, however, could stimulate social entrepreneurs to search for programs applicable to additional segments of the prison population.

This paper describes case studies informed by economic theories of crime and incentive alignment. Most approaches to recidivism reduction/desistance have failed, but several programs, including the DOE Fund and PEP, have proven extremely effective: the first by employing former convicts in starter jobs and the latter by teaching inmates about entrepreneurship and general business skills and mentoring them after release.

Successful cases cannot simply be scaled up because inmates self-select into the programs. Instead, policymakers should encourage further competition and innovation in the field by paying NGOs each week they manage to keep the formerly imprisoned persons in their charge alive and out of the criminal justice system.

Case study and theoretical. Not yet tried in the real world.

Lower recidivism, more desistance for the same budget.

Humans will be better treated than currently.

Instead of offering a specific recidivism reduction panacea, this paper suggests that incentive alignment and competition for funding will encourage nonprofit NGOs to discover which programs work best for different types of inmates.

Business corporations (and unincorporated joint-stock companies) formed in Britain and the United States in the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth century were lightly regulated by today’s standards and, as startups, sold equity directly to investors without the aid of intermediaries, yet they suffered relatively few governance breakdowns. That is because republican government-style checks against the arbitrary power of any group of stakeholders (managers, blockholders, directors) suffused their founding documents (charters/constitutions, articles of agreement, bylaws), raising the expected costs of defalcation above the expected benefits. Over the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, the original checks disintegrated. They were functionally replaced twice, first by financial capitalism a la J. P. Morgan, then by corporate raiders and takeover specialists like KKR, but politicians neutralized the first and managers (and judges) the second, leaving many widely held corporations today under the control of CEOs/Board Chairmen who can self-deal with near impunity and have apparent incentives to do so. A return to the precepts of the republican model could help to improve governance outcomes in the future.

This paper attempts to reconcile an apparent contradiction between short‐run and long‐run movements in the price of gold. The theoretical model suggests a set of conditions under which the price of gold rises over time at the general rate of inflation and hence be an effective hedge against inflation. The model also demonstrates that short‐run changes in the gold lease rate, the real interest rate, convenience yield, default risk, the covariance of gold returns with other assets and the dollar/world exchange rate can disturb this equilibrium relationship and generate short‐run price volatility. Using monthly gold price data (1976–1999), and cointegration regression techniques, an empirical analysis confirms the central hypotheses of the theoretical model.

This manuscript develops a reverse logistics monitoring system for controlling reverse flows of materials through marketing channels in emerging economies. Institutional theory is incorporated to show that both positive and negative impacts on environmental sustainability can be predicted. A partner control framework and scales are then developed for use by managers and researchers in furthering their understanding of the effective management of global reverse logistic networks

Decisions on provision of international short term aid are often undertaken on an emotional, public relations driven basis. Such decisions may result in an inefficient and ineffective allocation of resources in terms of helping the most people at the lowest total cost. Using ideas from the marketing literature on the importance of distribution channels in effective and efficient delivery of non‐profit products and services, this paper addresses the issues of efficiency and effectiveness in allocation of short term relief aid. A framework is developed to assist decision makers in understanding how distribution factors might affect delivery of such aid.

Outlines a method for controlling for compositional factors in the measurement of poverty. Bases the method on “shift‐share analysis” and “direct standardization”, consistent with Sen’s (1976) influential axiomatic approach to poverty measurement. Employs the popular poverty index proposed by Foster et al. (1984), which is one of the few summary poverty measures that can be directly standardized and also meets Sen’s criteria. The method is illustrated by examining the trend in absolute and relative poverty in the UK. Uses data from the “Family Expenditure Survey”, covering the period 1968 to 1986, and places specific empirical focus on the relationship between household structure and poverty.

The purpose of the analysis is to estimate price elasticities of demand for individual FTSE‐100 stocks between 1 August 1994 and 31 July 1995.

This paper measures excess demand in order to measure the slope of the demand curve for individual stocks. An econometric approach is adopted that models the slope of the excess demand curve within an econometric framework using signed market maker transactions data between 1 August 1994 and 31 July 1995.

The findings confirm that the demand curves for individual stocks do slope downwards. For example, the mean estimated percentage fall in stock price caused by a new share issue that is 1 per cent of the existing number of outstanding shares is −5.6.

Downward sloping demand curves pose difficulties for theories in finance that rely on the law of one price and price‐takers in competitive markets. For example, the dividend policy and capital structure irrelevance theorems of corporate finance, and the efficient markets hypothesis assumption that the price of a stock is determined only by information about future cash flows and the discount rate are not consistent with a downward sloping demand curve.

The slope of the demand curve is estimated using an econometric model and market makers' transactions data for specific stocks. This approach identifies observable unexpected shifts in the demand for a stock as unexpected changes in market makers' inventories. This approach is superior to event studies because it provides multiple observations that enable the slope of the demand curve to be quantified with sufficient confidence to calculate the price elasticity of demand for the stock.

Why is it that highly trained and seasoned executives fail? On the surface, this doesn’t make sense because they are very successful; yet research in the organization sciences provides no shortage of evidence to prove just that. From the classic Mann Gulch fire disaster of Weick’s famous collapse of sensemaking study, to studies of myopia of learning, escalation of commitment, threat-rigidity, dominant logic, the architecture of simplicity, the Icarus Paradox, to core competencies turning into core rigidities, and navigating new competitive markets using “old” cognitive maps, and many more such examples point to a ubiquitous phenomenon where highly trained and experienced professionals find themselves “stuck” in the heat of battle, unable to move and progress. On the one hand, for some, there is a desperate need for change, but are unable to do so, due to their trained incapacities. On the other hand, some simply cannot see the need for change, and continue with their “business as usual” mentality. For both, their visions of the world shrink, they have a tendency to cling onto their past habitual practices and oversimplify the complexity of the situation. In moments like these: DROP YOUR TOOLS and UNLEARN! This book chapter introduces a framework (grounded in clinical psychology) that has had consistent success in helping seasoned executives and key decision-makers open up the alternatives whenever they find themselves stuck with complexity.